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Most developed countries, and an increasing number
of developing ones, aspire to provide universal access
to healthcare for their citizens. All, however, have
resource constraints and must inevitably make prio-
rities in determining their coverage decisions. Conse-
quently, when making decisions about the availability
of therapeutic interventions both cost effectiveness, as
well as clinical effectiveness, must be taken into
account by decision-makers.1Decisions about the rational use of therapeutic interventions in populations
require a robust approach to the evaluation of the underpinning evidence.
Additionally, however, decision-makers must exercise judgement.
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The evidence supporting the clinical effectiveness of
a therapeutic intervention may be either experimental
(ie, based on the results of randomized controlled
trials), or observational in character.2 Some national
and international advisory bodies have developed
“hierarchies” of evidence that give unreasonable
prominence to randomized controlled trials in their
evaluation of the clinical evidence supporting the use
of particular interventions. As I have argued
elsewhere2 it is not the method itself that is of
importance, but whether the particular method is
appropriate to answer the speciﬁc question that is
posed. Moreover, modern decision-analytic techni-
ques often involve combining the results from experi-
mental and observational study designs3 and which
hierarchies are incapable of accommodating.
Appraising the clinical effectiveness of a therapeutic
intervention, for populations, also involves evaluating
its effectiveness in comparison with alternatives, in-
cluding where there are no active treatments, for best
supportive care.3 Identifying appropriate comparator
interventions, in conditions for which treatments are
already available, often poses problems for decision-
makers. Conﬁning such “active comparators” only to1634those that are licensed for treating the same condition
is often inappropriate. Many established treatments
(dexamethasone for the treatment of multiple mye-
loma is just one of numerous examples) have never
been licensed for the purpose despite being in wide-
spread use; and in pediatrics “off-label” prescribing is,
of necessity, very common. Reference to published
clinical guidelines may be of some assistance but, since
few of these take cost effectiveness into account, their
usefulness may be limited. Advice from relevant
experts on what constitutes “current best practice”
may be of value but anything approaching a con-
sensus is often difﬁcult to achieve. In practice, most
decision-makers use a combination of approaches
although their conclusions are often contentious.
Having decided on the most appropriate compara-
tor(s), decision-makers must then determine the best
approach to a quantitative comparison. Ideally they
will have access to the results of one or more direct
comparisons between the new intervention (interven-
tion A) and the chosen comparator (intervention B). In
reality, such direct comparisons are often unavailable
and decision-makers must rely on either indirect, or
mixed treatment, comparisons.3 Indirect comparisons
involve using the results of placebo-controlled studies
(placebo versus intervention A, placebo versus inter-
vention B) and estimating the difference between
intervention A versus intervention B by imputation.4
Mixed treatment comparisons involve combining theVolume 35 Number 10
M.D. Rawlinsresults of direct and indirect comparisons in a network
model.5
Cost Effectiveness
The economic evaluation of an intervention in-
volves estimating its incremental (additional) costs and
beneﬁts compared with those of one or more of the
appropriate comparators (including, where appropri-
ate, best supportive care). The incremental costs
divided by the incremental beneﬁts yields the “incre-
mental cost effectiveness ratio” (the ICER).3
The incremental costs obviously include the acqui-
sition costs of the intervention. They will also include
the costs of extra monitoring requirements (such as
extra blood tests or X-rays) and any additional
medical or nursing time needed. The cost calculations
should also incorporate the consequences of the
management of any adverse effects. The incremental
costs will be reduced if the use of the intervention is
associated direct savings (sometimes known as “cost
offsets”) to the healthcare system.
Depending on the economic perspective to be used,
the evaluation may incorporate indirect costs or
savings arising from so-called “productivity” gains
or losses.3 These might include the savings from less
time off work or the costs arising from the need to
employ temporary help in the home. They might also
include the cost to society more broadly in providing
welfare services such as sickness or unemployment
beneﬁts.Table. A selection of incremental cost effectiveness r
programme
Intervention Indication
Alendronate Primary prevention of osteopor
Rituximab Aggressive non-Hodgkins lymph
Etanercept Severe psoriasis
Trastuzumab Early breast cancer
Dabigatran Stroke prevention in atrial ﬁbril
Golimumab Severe ankylosing spondylitis
Bortezomib Multiple myeloma
Pemetrexid Malignant mesothelioma
Imatinib Chronic myeloid leukaemia
Riluzole Motor neurone disease
Sunitinib Advanced renal cancer
October 2013The scope of the economic perspective is a political,
rather than a scientiﬁc, decision. The Statutory Instru-
ments creating the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence (NICE) currently oblige it to conﬁne
its perspective to costs and savings to the healthcare
system although this may change in the future. Other
countries (such as Sweden) take a broader – societal –
economic perspective. Although seemingly logical a
societal perspective may impose an additional degree
of uncertainty in its calculation; and has the potential
to disadvantage children and the elderly because
neither contributes ﬁnancially to an economy.
Furthermore, in the absence of full employment, the
net costs and savings to public funds will be zero
because as one person loses their job due to ill health
an unemployed person joins the workforce.
Most economic analyses express the beneﬁts of
therapeutic interventions in the form of cost utility
analyses. In this, the beneﬁts are expressed as the gain
in the quality of life multiplied by the time for which it
is enjoyed. This yields the “quality of life year gained”
or “QALY”. The gain in the quality of life produced
by an intervention is assessed using a generic instru-
ment such as the EuroQual-5D.6 In this, the quality of
life is expressed as a change in health utility on a scale
between 0 ¼ dead and 1 ¼ full health. Using this scale,
for example, a hip prosthesis for osteoarthritis gives
an increased utility of 0.3; and, since hip prostheses
are on average “enjoyed” by recipients for 15 years,
the QALY gained is 0.3 x 15 ¼ 4.5. If the cost of a hipatios (ICERs) from NICE’s technology appraisals
ICER (£ per QALY gained)
otic fractures 9000
oma 10,500
14,500
18,000
lation 18,900
27,000
32,500
34,500
36,000
40,000
55,000
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then the ICER – at its crudest – is £5000 C 4.5 ¼
£1100 per QALY gained.
The advantage of cost utility analysis is its uni-
versality. Because the beneﬁts are expressed as a
change in health utility (derived from the EuroQol-
5D) the cost effectiveness of one intervention, for the
treatment of one condition, can be directly compared
with the cost effectiveness of another intervention for
an entirely different condition. This point is illustrated
in the Table which shows a sample of ICERs, taken
from NICE’s technology appraisals programme, for a
number of interventions, across very different
indications.
Calculating the ICER is of limited value for
decision-makers without deﬁning a “threshold” dis-
tinguishing cost effective, from cost ineffective, inter-
ventions. Various approaches have been proposed to
identify the point at which a particular ICER imposes
an intolerable opportunity cost to a healthcare system.
They include:1.1Listing all the interventions that could be used by a
healthcare system, in ascending order, and deﬁning
the threshold as the point which the healthcare
budget is exhausted. The problem with this ap-
proach is that there is no reliable evidence base
upon which such a list could even begin to be
produced.2. Enquiring, from members of the public, what they
are “willing to pay” for improved quality of their
healthcare. Although this method has been applied
to other ﬁelds (such as transport economics) its
appropriateness in a tax-funded system, such as the
UK’s National Health Service, has been questioned.3. Examining overall expenditure patterns for various
disease groupings and impute a cost effectiveness
threshold. Critics of this method suggest that it
assumes all current healthcare expenditure is cost
effective.4. The suggestion by the World Health Organization
that the threshold should be a function of a
country’s per capita gross domestic product
(GDP). Using this measure they suggest that an
ICER of less than a nation’s per capita GDP should
always be regarded as cost effective; and that an
ICER of more than three times per capita GDP
should invariably be considered to be cost ineffec-
tive. Although it seems intuitively appropriate to
link cost effectiveness thresholds to per capita GDP
the basis for the upper and lower limits are unclear.6365. Inferring a threshold, as with NICE, from previous
decisions. Based on its early experience NICE has
adopted a threshold range of £20,000 to £30,000
per QALY gained which is largely based on the
collective judgement of the UK’s health economists.
Curiously, or perhaps coincidentally, this is similar
to the thresholds suggested by extrapolation from
the approaches described in 2), 3) and 4) above.
DECISION-MAKING
Whether, or not, an intervention should be available
in a particular healthcare system requires not only
careful consideration of the evidence but also requires
for judgements to be made. These judgements fall into
two types – scientiﬁc judgements and social value
judgements7.
Scientific Judgements
Scientiﬁc judgements are required to interpret the
science that underpins the evidence base7. The
evidence is never perfect and there is always be
additional information that decision-makers might
wish to see before drawing their conclusions; but
insisting on “perfect information” would prevent
them from ever making any decisions at all.
Decision-makers must therefore make judgements.
These typically involve resolving three questions3:1. How reliable is evidence for effectiveness? The
answer will require scrutiny of the design of the
studies on which the evidence is based, the end-
points used in the assessment of likely efﬁcacy, and
the approach that has been taken in evaluating the
impact of the intervention on the quality of life.
Relying on hierarchies of evidence is no
substitute.2,32. Are the results generalizable to the wider popula-
tion in whom the intervention is likely to be used?
When new pharmaceutical products are intro-
duced, their effectiveness will have been studied in
relatively small homogeneous populations. Effec-
tiveness in older people, those with a range of
co-morbidities, and for prolonged periods of time,
may be uncertain.3. Is it appropriate to limit an intervention’s use to
subgroups of patients? It is not uncommon for an
intervention to be cost ineffective overall but cost
effective in a speciﬁc subgroup of the population of
potential recipients. Judgements have to be made
about the appropriateness of what is often a post
hoc subgroup analysis; as well as judgements aboutVolume 35 Number 10
M.D. Rawlinsthe extent to which the members of such subgroups
can be reliable identiﬁed in advance of starting
treatment.
The expert members of appropriate advisory bodies –
including clinicians as well as statisticians and econo-
mists – should be chosen to make such scientiﬁc
judgements.Social Value Judgements
Social values relate to the social sciences rather
than to the clinical sciences.7 They include issues such
as whether an extra year of the life of children should
be regarded as more valuable than an extra year of life
of their grandparents; or whether it is appropriate for
healthcare systems to pay premium prices for
interventions used in the treatment of very rare
diseases.
The members of conventional scientiﬁc advisory
bodies have no legitimacy to impose their own social
values on the healthcare systems for which they are
responsible.8 The manner in which such social values
are elicited, and incorporated into decisions about
availability and use of therapeutic interventions, varies
between different jurisdictions. In some, social values
are either implicitly, or explicitly, imposed by politi-
cians (primarily health ministers). Others attempt to
derive social values from the population. NICE has
pioneered the use of a “Citizens Council”, drawn
from the general population, to establish the social
values it should adopt in its appraisals of the use of
therapeutic interventions in the UK’s National Health
Service.8
The social values that decision-makers must incor-
porate will depend, fundamentally, on the approach
of the healthcare system to “distributive justice” .3,8,9
This is the term used by political and moral philoso-
phers in considering what is right, or just, in the
allocation of goods within society. Three moral
theories of distributive justice have a particular reso-
nance for the allocation of resources in healthcare9:1.OLibertarianism is based on the premise that indivi-
duals should be able and expected to ﬁnance their
healthcare through their own efforts; and that
market forces should enable them to do so at a
reasonable price. This approach underpins much of
the provision of healthcare in the USA but most
developed countries – and an increasing number ofctober 2013developing countries – attempt to provide universal
healthcare for all their citizens. Even in the US,
however, around 50% of the population’s health-
care is met from public funds through programmes
such as Medicare and Medicaid.2. Utilitarianism, in its purest form, seeks to maximize
social utility and is sometimes expressed as “the
greatest good for the greatest number”. In this
approach expenditure on healthcare should be used
to maximise population health as a whole. It asserts
that adopting an intervention that is clinically or
cost ineffective in one area of clinical practice will
deprive other people, with other conditions, of cost
effective care. Although emphasizing “efﬁciency”,
utilitarianism allows the interests of minorities to
be over-ridden by majorities; and it does little to
eradicate health inequalities.93. Egalitarianism postulates that, in healthcare, re-
sources should be distributed in a manner that
allows each individual to have a fair share of the
opportunities available. It allows an adequate, but
not necessarily a maximum, level of healthcare but
raises difﬁcult questions about what is fair and
what is bad luck.9The tensions between utilitarianism and egalitar-
ianism can be overstated.3,9 Many utilitarians accept
that social values could (and should) be incorporated
into decision-making. Qualiﬁed egalitarians also ac-
cept the concept of opportunity costs with all its moral
implications. There is no formal synthesis, however, of
these two latter theories of distributive justice. Both
clash at some point with the convictions of many
people; and each articulates ideas that most would be
reluctant to relinquish.3,9
Figure shows the relationship between the
likelihood of rejection of an intervention, on
grounds of cost ineffectiveness, and the incremental
cost effectiveness ration (ICER). Interventions with an
ICER less than that at inﬂection A (£20,000 per
QALY gained) would normally be expected to be
considered cost effective. For interventions above
inﬂection B (£30,000 per QALY gained) one or
more social values would have to be taken into
account for them to be considered cost effective and
an appropriate use of healthcare resources. These
particularly include the severity of the underlying
condition (especially where there are no effective
treatments), treatments that prolong life at the end
of life, signiﬁcant innovations whose impact might not
have been fully captured in the clinical data, and1637
Probability
of
Rejection
Incremental cost effectiveness ratio (£) per QALY
A
B
Figure. Relationship between the likelihood of
rejection on grounds of cost ineffective-
ness and the incremental cost effective-
ness ratio (ICER).
Clinical Therapeuticsdisadvantaged populations. Indeed, all the
interventions shown in Table 1 were considered, by
NICE, to be an appropriate use of NHS resources and
for those with ICERs of more than £30,000 per
QALY gained it was social value judgements that
proved to be the deciding factor.10
At the present, NICE’s advisory bodies take a
subjective approach to incorporating social value
judgements into their decisions. In the future, how-
ever, at least some of them may be given quantitative
weightings so as to ensure consistency as well as a
greater degree of certainty.11
CONCLUSIONS
Decisions about the rational use of therapeutic inter-
ventions, in populations, require a robust approach to
the appraisal of all the available clinical and economic1638evidence. This evidence, however, never supplants the
need for decision-makers to take both scientiﬁc, and
social value, judgements into account when making
coverage decisions.REFERENCES
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